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construction of Japanese cruisers
throughout the 1930s (p. 107), when in
fact cruiser construction stopped after
the completion of the Takao class in
1932 and did not resume until 1937. The
“decks filled with aircraft” at Midway
(p. 156) is an assertion Parshall proved
false long ago, while the idea of the “F6F
and TBF being near twins” (p. 163)
makes no sense, given their completely
different roles and specifications. The
exaggerations—such as that Somerville’s
fleet would “not [have been] out of place
at Tsushima” (p. 16), and the reference
to “octogenarian” aircraft (p. 47), when
aviation itself was barely thirty-five
years old—are just unnecessary.
To summarize, this book probably
will disappoint serious historians and
researchers, but nevertheless it does
gather together a host of useful
thoughts about the problems of block
obsolescence and the integration of new
capabilities within a fleet in peacetime.
Given that these points may stimulate
future work or serve to educate the
amateur enthusiast, all is not lost. But
the book could have been so much more.
ANGUS ROSS

Cyber Mercenaries: The State, Hackers, and Power, by Tim Maurer. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge
Univ. Press, 2018. 266 pages. $29.99 (paperback).

The use of proxies as a part of the competition and conflict between states is
an ancient and time-tested method. Yet
from the mercenaries of the pharaoh’s
army in ancient Egypt to private military
and security companies accompanying
militaries in modern conflict, each
relationship between a state and its
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proxies is unique and is driven by a
multitude of factors. In this timely and
well-researched book, Tim Maurer
examines how modern states use cyber
proxies to pursue their geopolitical aims.
The introduction of Maurer’s book is a
deep dive into the evolution of the use
of cyber proxies by states. Unlike many
authors of popular books examining
the use of cyber operations, Maurer
feels no need to sensationalize the cyber
realm. Instead, we get a realistic and
accurate assessment of the capabilities
of cyber proxies. If there is a weakness
to his introduction, it is that he focuses
on traditional “hacking,” or denial-ofservice cyber operations. Although
this approach is quite understandable
and is representative of most scholarly
work on cyber, recent trends suggest a
greater use of algorithmic exploitation
to conduct information-operation
campaigns. These campaigns are unique
in that they do not appear to break
any laws, domestic or international.
Following the introduction, Maurer
proceeds to provide a logical, analytical
framework for categorizing cyber proxies and how states use them. This is no
small task, given the variety of roles and
relationships these groups have vis-à-vis
their respective state organizations.
Maurer organizes the various modes of
proxy use into three main categories: delegation, orchestration, and sanctioning.
Delegation is the proxy relationship in
which the state exerts the greatest degree
of control over its proxy. An example
is the relationship between the U.S.
Defense Department and a contractor
providing a cyber capability. In orchestration, the state may provide limited
logistical support or general guidance
to the proxy, but stops short of issuing
specific instructions. This relationship
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often exists when there is a common
ideology between state and proxy.
Sanctioning is a relationship whereby the
proxy is permitted to engage in malicious activities, so long as the ends align
with the goals of the state. An example
is Russian criminal organizations that
are permitted to operate as long as they
target only non-Russians with their
criminal activities and occasionally
turn their skills to patriotic purposes.
The next two sections are the strength
of Maurer’s book. He closely examines
all three proxy relationships, identifying
the strengths and weaknesses of each
type and using historical examples to
illustrate his conclusions. Maurer clearly
establishes historically the benefit of
proxies to states and explains why
states are likely to use cyber proxies as
a tool for the foreseeable future. Maurer
also does identify the standards for
international legal responsibility that
states bear for their proxies; however,
after initially identifying these standards,
he discusses them only minimally
throughout his later case studies.
National security practitioners likely
will gain the most insight from these
case studies, in which Maurer applies his
analytical framework to the use of proxies by the United States, Iran, Russia,
and China. Drawing on the most recent
events to highlight the use of cyber proxies by these states, he weaves together
the economic, social, and political realities of each state and analyzes how these
factors affect its use of proxies. Although
it is tempting to view proxy relationships as being determined solely by the
governmental actors, Maurer reveals
how proxies often are a natural outgrowth of their societies. For example,
he discusses how a combination of
excellent technical training and poor job
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prospects has led to the increased use
of sanctioning as a proxy relationship in
countries of the former Soviet Union.
In conclusion, Cyber Mercenaries is both
enjoyable to read and an important
contribution to scholarship on the study
of cyber conflicts. It dispels many of the
myths and misunderstandings surrounding the use of proxies and provides an
analytical framework that can be applied
easily when following news reporting
on international conflicts in cyberspace.
It should be on the bookshelf of every
scholar and practitioner in this vital
field of national security studies.
JEFFREY BILLER

Shadow over the Atlantic: The Luftwaffe and the
U-boats, 1943–45, by Robert Forsyth. Oxford,
U.K.: Osprey, 2017. 312 pages. $30.

As the Second World War recedes ever
further into the past, more and more
works emerge that focus on historical
back pastures or operations either
overlooked or examined only lightly
until now. Shadow over the Atlantic is an
example of such works, but it is also a
welcome contribution to understanding
the vital Axis anticonvoy campaign and
the role of the Luftwaffe in waging war
at sea. Robert Forsyth is an experienced
author, with a specialty in World War
II German aircraft. He tells the story of
the attempts by the German navy and
air force to coordinate operations so
as to maneuver Admiral Karl Dönitz’s
U-boats into position to savage Allied
convoys. In doing so, Forsyth focuses
nearly exclusively on the operations of
Long-Range Reconnaissance Group
5, Atlantic (designated FAGr-5).
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